Coalitional network games are real-valued functions defined on a set of players organized into a network and a coalition structure. We adopt a flexible approach assuming that players organize themselves the best way possible by forming the efficient coalitional network structure. We propose two allocation rules that distribute the value of the efficient coalitional network structure: the atom-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule and the player-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule.
Introduction
network games that shares the value generated by a given coalitional network taking into account the contribution of each player not only to the coalitional network that actually forms but also to every alternative coalitional network that could have been formed. We adopt Jackson's (2005) flexible approach because the efficient coalitional network is not necessarily the one where all players are linked to each other and belong to the grand coalition; i.e., the complete coalitional network. This means that we must care about how to allocate value to some coalitional networks that are not the complete coalitional network. In such cases, the allocation of value may depend on information about the roles of players that require calculations based on coalitional networks that are not subcoalitional networks of a given coalitional network. 6 Observe that we develop a specific approach to adapt the Shapley value to our framework. The Shapley value is originally applied to the boolean lattice of sets ordered by inclusion where each player is an element of the lattice. As singleton, each player is an atom (that covers the empty set) in the lattice of sets and the Shapley value allocates the value of the grand coalition to these lattice elements. In our setting, players do not appear as elements of the lattice of coalitional networks partially ordered. In order to circumvent this difficulty, we allocate a value to the atoms of the lattice under consideration, like the Shapley value for TU games, and then to the players.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides definitions for coalitional 2 Coalitional networks Let N = {1, ..., n} be the finite set of players who are connected in some network relationship and who belong to some coalitions. A coalitional network (g, P ) is a pair that consists of a network g and a coalition structure or partition P .
A network g is a list of (unordered) pairs of players linked to each other and is represented by an undirected graph. A link between two players i, j ∈ N , i = j, is denoted ij or ji. For notational convenience, when the identities of linked players are not needed, we use the generic symbol l to designate a link. The set of all possible networks is denoted G = {g | g ⊆ g N }, where g N denotes the set of all subsets of N of size 2; i.e. the complete network. Let g S denote the complete network among players in S ⊆ N . Throughout the paper we use the notation ⊆ for weak inclusion and ⊂ for strict inclusion. Thus, g ∅ is the empty network where all players are isolated. For any network g, let N (g) = {i | ∃j such that ij ∈ g} be the set of players who have at least one link in the network g. Let n(g) ≡ |N (g)|. As it is implicitly stated in the definition of G, a network is considered as a set of links and the set of all possible networks is partially ordered by inclusion. A network g ∈ G is a subnetwork of a network g ∈ G if the set of links in g is weakly included in g, g ⊆ g. The infimum (meet) and supremum (join) of any two networks g, g ∈ G exist and are respectively written g ∩ g and g ∪ g , and (G, ⊆) is a lattice with bottom element g ∅ and top element g N . A network g covers a network g if g ⊂ g and there is no network g such that g ⊂ g ⊂ g. The set of networks that cover the bottom element g ∅ , the set of atoms A(G, ⊆), are the one-link networks l ⊂ g N .
A maximal decomposition of a network g in terms of atoms is the expression of g as the supremum of all atoms included in g. Formally,
where A(g) is the set of atoms (one link networks) included in g.
We say that a lattice L is ranked is there exists a function r : L → N defined recursively by r(⊥) = 0 with ⊥ ∈ L the bottom element of L and r(x) = r(y) + 1 with x, y ∈ L such that x covers y. We can see that the lattice (G, ⊆) is ranked and each element g ∈ G has rank r(g) = |g|. The rank of a network g is precisely the number of links in g and corresponds to the number of atoms included in the network. The degree of an element x of a lattice L is the number of elements that
x covers in L. Hence, we identify the number of atoms in g with the degree of g.
Observe that if a network g covers a network g then there exists a network a ∈ A(g) such that g ∪ a = g and the network g has one more link than g , r(g) = r(g ) + 1.
For any two networks g, g ∈ G, the rank function satisfies the following identity:
A coalition is a subset S ⊆ N and a coalition structure (or partition) is a collection of nonempty mutually disjoint coalitions whose union is N . We denote a coalition structure P = {S 1 , ..., S m } such that S k = ∅ for k = 1, . . . , m, S k ∩S k = ∅, k = k and k S k = N . A k-partition is a partition P that consists of k coalitions;
i.e., |P | = k. The set of possible coalition structures (or partitions) on N is denoted P and is partially ordered under the refinement ordering . Let P, P be partitions of N . We say that P is a refinement of P or is finer than P , denoted P P , if any coalition of P is a subset of a coalition of P . Strict refinement is denoted <. The dual relation of the refinement is the coarsening relation. The infimum and supremum between any two partitions P and P exist and are respectively P ∧ P and P ∨ P . The poset (P, ) is thus a lattice. The bottom element of the partition lattice (P, ) is the finest partition P ⊥ = {{1}, . . . , {n}}. The top element, i.e. the coarsest partition, is the grand coalition P = {N }. The atoms A(P, ) are the elements that cover the finest partition and are partitions whose only non-trivial coalition is a two-element coalition. That is, Q ij ∈ A(P, ) if there exist i, j ∈ N such that {i, j} ∈ Q ij and all other coalitions of Q ij are singletons. The lattice (P, ) is ranked and each element P has rank r(P ) = n − |P |. Any partition P covered by P have the same coalitions as P except one that is divided in two coalitions in P . Hence, for any P, P ∈ P such that P covers P , we have that P has one more coalition than P , r(P ) = r(P ) + 1. For any two partitions P, P ∈ P, the rank function satisfies r(P ) + r(P ) ≥ r(P ∨ P ) + r(P ∧ P ), hence (P, ) is a semimodular lattice. A lattice (L, ∨, ∧) is (upper) semimodular if for all x, y ∈ L we have that x ∧ y ≺ x and x ∧ y ≺ y imply x ≺ x ∨ y and y ≺ x ∨ y. A distributive lattice is semimodular, while the converse is not necessarily true.
A maximal decomposition of a partition P in terms of atoms is the expression of P as the supremum of all atoms finer than P . Formally,
where A(P ) is the set of atoms (partition with only one nontrivial two-element coalition) finer than P . The class of a partition P ∈ P is defined by the collection of integers c P = c P 1 , . . . , c P n such that c P k is the number of coalitions of P consisting of exactly k players. Thus n k=1 c P k k = n and n k=1 c P k = n − r(P ) = |P |. The size s P of a partition P ∈ P is the number of atoms finer than P . That is,
A coalitional network consists of a pair (g, P ) ∈ G × P. We define the ordering relation on (G × P) × (G × P) such that (g, P ) (g , P ) if and only if g ⊆ g in G and P P in P. Since (G×P, ) is defined as the Cartesian product of two lattices, it has also a lattice structure. Moreover, it inherits the semimodularity property of the partition lattice. The bottom and top elements of the lattice (G × P, ) are (g ∅ , P ⊥ ) and (g N , {N }) respectively. Atom elements in A(G × P, ) take one of the following two forms, (l, P ⊥ ) or (g ∅ , Q ij ) with l ∈ G being a one-link network and Q ij ∈ A(P, ). If (g a , P a ) is an atom, i ∈ (g a , P a ) means that player i is either a node of the one-link network or a member of the sole two-member coalition.
From direct calculations we have |A(G × P, )| = (n(n − 1)/2) + n 2 = n(n − 1).
Each element (g, P ), with P = {S 1 , . . . , S k } being a k-partition, is covered by k 2 + |g N | − |g| elements and covers S∈P 2 |S|−1 − |P | + |g| elements. The number of atoms in a maximal decomposition of any (g, P ) is |A(g, P )| = s P + |g| with s P defined in (1) . Let |A(g, P )| be the degree of the coalitional network (g, P ) and denote it by d(g, P ). For any player i ∈ N and (g, P ) ∈ G × P, we denote by d i (g, P ) the degree of player i in the coalitional network (g, P ). The degree d i (g, P )
is the number of atoms to which i belongs, that is the number of links player i has in g and the number of two-player coalitions in atoms finer than P to which player i belongs. Finally, we denote by n(g, P ) the number of players that have at least one link in g or that are not singletons in P . That is, n(g, P ) = |N (g, P )| with
We now present some properties fulfilled by the lattice of coalitional networks that are of interest for the sequel. A coalitional network game assigns a real value to each possible pair consisting of a network g and a partition P that represents the total value generated by the set of players when organized under (g, P ). The set of all possible coalitional network games is denoted V and can be identified with the vector space R |G|×|P|−1 .
A coalitional network game is a richer object than a cooperative network game or a classical coalitional game because it allows the value generated to depend both on the network structure and on the organization of players into partitions. Coalitional network games can be seen as network games with externalities, where the value generated by a network depends on the organization of the set of players into mutually disjoint coalitions, and converge to classical network games in case of absence of externalities (i.e. when the partition organization of players does not influence the worth). To emphasize the richness of coalitional network games, we can compare the vector space associated to them to the corresponding space of classical network games. Classical network games take values only on the set of possible networks G.
The number of possible networks in N is |G| = 2 n(n−1)/2 . Network games considered as real-valued functions on |G| can be identified with R |G|−1 . The number of possible partitions on N is the Bell number B n . 7 Thus, coalitional network games considered as real-valued functions on G × P can be identified with R |G|×Bn−1 .
The efficient coalitional network may not be unique. Of course, in case of multiplicity, they all achieve the same maximum value. The efficient coalitional networks represent the best way to organize the set of players in terms of networks and groups.
Two different interpretations can be offered to monotonic covers of coalitional network games. The first one corresponds to the one presented by Jackson (2005) .
The idea is that at the time of building a coalitional network, players consider all the available possibilities, and, if there is still some possibility to modify the coalitional network, then it is useful to consider which structure generates the maximum possible value. This approach is called flexible by Jackson in the context of network games without externalities. Another interpretation is the following. In classical coalitional games, it is usually assumed that the game is superadditive so that the grand coalition generates the maximum value and is thus formed. In the coalitional network games context, this is a too strong assumption, since it is often the case that forming or maintaining links induces costs and the grand coalition is not necessarily the one that maximizes the worth. Instead, we assume here that the complete network and the grand coalition form, but only activate or declare some links and groups in order to generate the maximum value. The complete network and the grand coalition have all links and subgroups at their disposal but only use some of them to cooperate. A set of players with communication links g N can use any network g ⊆ g N to cooperate. A set of players forming a unique group {N } are free to group themselves into smaller groups to achieve higher values. 8 Hence, the complete network and the grand coalition always get the maximum value under its monotonic cover.
Notice that if a coalitional network game is monotonic, then v =v. A monotonic coalitional network game attributes to a coalitional network a higher value than the value it attributes to its subcoalitional networks. This may not be a very natural property in coalitional network games since the top coalitional network structure is not always efficient. Nevertheless, we can draw some useful information about how allocation rules perform on monotonic coalitional network games.
A special family of monotonic coalitional network games consists of the unanimity coalitional network games. For a coalitional network (g, P ) ∈ G×P, let u g,P ∈ V denote the unanimity coalitional network game satisfying
Each coalitional network game u g,P can be seen as a vector in R |G|×Bn−1 . The |G| × B n − 1 different u g,P 's are linearly independent, hence the set
of all unanimity coalitional network games forms a linear basis for R |G|×Bn−1 ≡ V (see Gilboa and Lehrer, 1991) . Each coalitional network game v ∈ V can thus be
Each coefficient ∆ g,P (v) is called the Harsanyi dividend (see Harsanyi, 1959) .
The dividend of a given element (g, P ) of the lattice (G × P, ) represents the value that is left to (g, P ) once all (g , P ) included in (g, P ) have received their corresponding dividends. By combining results from Grabisch (2010) and Caulier (2010), the numerical value of a coefficient is found by
Flexibility and equal treatment
In order to keep track of how the value generated by a coalitional network is allocated to players, we adopt the flexible approach of Jackson (2005). 9 Two different allocation rules are proposed. The atom-based allocation rule focuses on the role played by the minimal forms of cooperation among players in generating the value.
The player-based allocation rule emphasizes the role of the players in achieving the value.
Definition 5. An allocation rule for a coalitional network game v ∈ V is a function
It is important to note that an allocation rule depends on g, P and v. This allows an allocation rule to take full account of a player i's role in the network and in the coalition structure. This includes not only what the network configuration and coalition structure are, but also and how the value generated depends on the overall network and coalition structure. Note that efficiency ( i ψ i (g, P, v) = v(g, P )) is assumed in the definition of an allocation rule. The allocation rule only depends on the monotonic cover of the coalitional network game and distributes the value taken by the efficient configuration. This is consistent with the perspective that the coalitional network is being formed and that it can still be modified, or that the complete network together with the grand coalition are formed but only use a subnetwork and a partition efficient relative
to v. The idea from the flexible perspective is that inefficient coalitional network structures should not be reached.
Note in the definition that the equivalence is only required on efficient structures, as the value that accrues to other coalitional networks might not even be the same (i.e. v(g, P ) =v(g, P ) for inefficient (g, P )).
The next property states how the values in two different games are related. The property states the behavior followed by the players concerning the distribution of the value generated when confronted to different games. 10 
and if av − bv is monotonic, then
Again, the weakly linearity condition only applies to monotonic coalitional network games, the only relevant information if we consider the coalitional network as flexible.
As a matter of equity, Jackson (2005) proposes to share the value in a unanimity game equally between essential players or, for link-based allocation rules, between essential links, whichever you consider as vital in generating value. In coalitional network games, basic ingredients are not the players. The mathematical structure in terms of lattice shows that the minimal aggregation form in a coalitional network is an atom, which takes the form of either a link between two players together with the trivial partition or a partition whose unique non-singleton coalition is a pair of players together with the empty network. In order to assess the contribution to cooperation of players in this context, we argue that the role played by each atom must first be assessed. In the network game setting, the contribution of a player may be computed in terms of the links she controls. In coalitional network games, the contribution of a player may be computed in terms of the atoms controlled by the player; that is, either the links controlled by the player in the existing network or the partitions with only one nontrivial two-element coalition to which the player belongs that are finer than the existing partition.
Hence we propose the following property: Recall that unanimity coalitional network games of (g, P ) are such that all atoms of (g, P ) are members of the decomposition of (g, P ), and then, the join of all these atoms is the (only) configuration that generates some value. Formally, for each (g, P ) ∈ G × P with A(g, P ) ⊆ A(G × P, ), the set of atoms such that (g a , P a ) ∈ A(g, P ) ⇒ (g a , P a ) (g, P ), and (g, P ) = (ga,Pa)∈A(g,P ) (g a , P a ). In a unanimity coalitional network game u g,P , all atoms of (g, P ) are identical, in the sense that they are vital in the generation of worth, while the other atoms are not part of the structures generating worth. We thus propose to distribute equally the value generated among these vital atoms. The 1/2 reflects the fact that the value of a given vital atom, either a link or the unique nontrivial two-element coalition of the partition, is controlled by two players.
The properties described above are enough to characterize a unique solution, that we call the atom-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule. 
The idea is first to calculate the dividends for the monotonic cover of the game under consideration, next, to distribute them equally among the atoms of the coalitional networks corresponding to these dividends and, finally, to the players essential to these atoms. This allocation rule thus stresses the importance of minimal forms of cooperation among players that can take the form of links or coalitions, before sharing the global worth to individuals.
In order to show the independence of the properties used in the characterizing theorem 1, the next proposition asserts that there exist allocation rules that satisfy all properties except one. Theorem 1 only applies to an efficient coalitional network (g, P ) relative to v. In order to have a complete definition of an allocation rule, we also need to specify how to allocate the value of inefficient coalitional networks. Following Jackson (2005) , we propose to use the allocation of efficient coalitional networks as a benchmark and to allocate the value of an inefficient coalitional network proportionally. Definition 9. An allocation rule ψ is proportional if for each i and v ∈ V either ψ i (g, P, v) = 0 for all (g, P ), or for any (g, P ) and (g , P ) such that v(g , P ) = 0,
Note first that the definition of proportional allocation rule covers the case where ψ i (g , P , v) = 0 since it thus implies that ψ i (g, P, v) = 0 for all (g, P ) = (g , P ).
When ψ i (g , P , v) = 0 condition (5) applies.
When an allocation rule is proportional, it has first to be determined on an efficient coalitional network and afterwards rescaled for the final inefficient coalitional network. When there are several efficient coalitional networks relative to a value function, a proportional allocation rule gives the same result. Indeed, proportionality for an allocation rule ψ implies that for all efficient coalitional networks (g, P ) and (g , P ) relative to v ∈ V, (g, P ) = (g , P ), we have by equation (5) ψ i (g, P, v) = ψ i (g , P , v) for all players i since v(g, P ) = v(g , P ). Suppose now that the final coalitional network (g, P ) achieves a value of 0 for v ∈ V : v(g, P ) = 0. Let (g , P ) an efficient coalitional network relative to v ∈ V. Then, by condition (5) we have ψ i (g, P, v) = 0 for all i. 
Note that proposition 3 can be used to show that all the properties of theorem 2 are independent.
If on the contrary, we think that the emphasis should be set directly on the players rather than indirectly, we propose to adapt the equity condition in Definition 8 as follows.
Definition 10. An allocation rule ψ satisfies equal treatment of vital players if u g,P ∈ V is a unanimity coalitional network game for some (g, P ), then ψ i (g, P, u g,P ) = 0 if i is isolated in g and a singleton in P ,
otherwise.
with n(g, P ) the number of players that have at least one link in g or that are not singletons in P .
In a unanimity coalitional network game, players not isolated in g or in P are all vital to the functioning of the coalitional network, in the sense that the value is generated by their cooperation and no other player contribute in any sense. It is not to say that a stand-alone player is not able to accomplish some valuable worth in a coalitional network, but our focus is on the worth generated through cooperation and how to share this value among cooperating players. In this case, players not isolated are considered as equals and isolated players contribute nothing. Hence, this equal treatment condition allocates the worth equally among the n(g, P ) players in N (g, P ).
Before presenting our player-based flexible allocation rule, we need the following definition :
Definition 11. The modular elements P mod of the partition lattice (P, ) over N are the partitions P ∈ P mod containing a unique non-trivial coalition as well as P ⊥ .
The finest partition P ⊥ and the coarsest partition {N } are modular elements.
Any other P ∈ P mod consists in a coalition {S} ∈ 2 N \ ∅ together with the singletons {{i}|i ∈ N \ S}. Hence, each P ∈ P mod can be uniquely characterized by its nontrivial coalition {S} ∈ 2 N \ ∅ and we may thus write with some abuse of notation the modular partition as {S} ∈ P mod . Note that the only one modular partition corresponding to all singleton coalitions {i}|{i} ∈ 2 N , is the trivial partition P ⊥ .
Hence the number of distinct modular partitions on N is |P mod | = 2 n − n, since P ⊥ has multiplicity n in P mod .
We now present the player-based flexible allocation with its characterizing properties. 
The proof of this theorem is a direct analog of the proof of Theorem 1, which appears in the appendix. If the end coalitional network is not an efficient one, we can once again use Definition 9 and adapt formula (7) to hold for any (g, P ), not necessarily efficient relative to v. 
The allocation rule (7) is close to the classical Shapley value (where Harsanyi dividends are shared equally among players). However, in this setting, we first deal with the monotonic cover of the value function as prescribed by our flexible approach and, second, players are involved in much more complicated structures consisting in both a network and a partition. To stress the similarities, let us express equation (7) in the following equivalent way, closer to the better known expression for the Shapley value (see Shapley, 1953) :
This amounts to define a TU-game c g,P,v : 2 N → R such that, for all S ∈ 2 N , c g,P,v (S) =v(g S , S). Then, the player-based flexible allocation rule (7) We also define v (g, P ) = w for all (g, P ) such that g has at least two links and 
Relationship with existing allocation rules
The allocation rules presented in this paper are generalizations of the Jackson (2005) player-based and link-based flexible allocation rules for network games to coalitional network games in which players may also form coalitions. The fact that we opt for a presentation in terms of Möbius transforms is mainly to avoid cumbersome notation or lengthy expression and should not confuse the reader to remark the strict equivalence of the Jackson allocation rules and the ones presented in this paper when coalition structures play no role, i.e. if v(g, P ) = v(g, P ) for all (g, P ) ∈ G × P, Efficiency
Null Player If for all S ∈ N \ i we have that c(S ∪ i) = c(S), then Φ S i (c) = 0.
Symmetry Φ S (πc) = πΦ S (c) with π a bijection from N to N .
for all c ∈ C, S, T ∈ 2 N \ ∅, S ∩ T = ∅. This amounts to write that for all c ∈ C :
The set of additive cooperative games appears to be the subspace consisting of fixed points for solutions. One could apply this property (that a solution for an additive game should be this game itself) to allocation rules for coalitional network games and identify the set of fixed point games that are trivially their own solutions.
We can define an allocation rule Ψ : V → V • , with V • the set of additive coalitional network games. A coalitional network game v is additive if v(g ∪ g , P ∨ P ) = v(g, P ) + v(g , P ) for all (g, P ), (g , P ) ∈ G × P \ {(g ∅ , P ⊥ )} such that g ∩ g = ∅ and P ∧ P = P ⊥ . However, due to the semimodularity of (G × P, ), an additive coalitional network game would convey the same value to each and every element of the lattice.
Proposition 4. If a coalitional network game v is additive, then v(g, P ) = v(g , P ) for all (g, P ), (g , P ) ∈ G×P \ {(g ∅ , P ⊥ )}, (g, P ) = (g , P ).
In our setting, additive games are not the set of games whose trivial allocation rule is the game itself, due to the semimodularity structure of (G × P, ). The By a similar argument if av −bv is monotonic, we have that ψ a i (av −bv ) = aψ a i (v)− bψ a i (v ). Equal treatment of vital atoms is easily checked to hold in (4) .
Second, we verify that any allocation rule satisfying equal treatment of atoms, By weak linearity, we have that φ g N , {N },v is equal to
By weak linearity again, we obtain
Since φ is a flexible coalitional network allocation rule then (g N , {N }) and (g, P ) take both the same value under the monotonic cover of u g,P for each (g, P ) ∈ G × P.
Finally, by equal treatment of vital atoms, the value is uniquely determined and thus,
Proof of proposition 3.
We show that for each property in theorem 1, there is an allocation rule different than ψ a given by (4) that satisfies the remaining other properties. 
satisfies weak linearity, equal treatment of vital atoms but is not a flexible rule because it does not depend on the monotonic cover of v and is calculated on sub-coalitional network games (g , P ) of (g, P ) only. If v is non-monotonic,
• Remove Equal Treatment of Vital Atoms : for all v ∈ V and (g, P ) ∈ G × P efficient relative to v, the allocation rule
is a flexible allocation rule that satisfies weak linearity but violates equal treatment of vital atoms.
• Remove Weak Linearity : Let v ∈ V and (g, P ) ∈ G × P. An atom (g a , P a ) ∈ (g, P ) is a null atom for v in (g, P ) if (g ,P )∈A(g,P )\(ga,Pa) (g , P ) ≺ (g, P )
and v(g, P ) = v   (g ,P )∈A(g,P )\(ga,Pa) (g , P )
  .
For all the other cases, the atoms are non-null. Denote by N A(g, P, v) the set of atoms (g , P ) ∈ A(g, P ) such that (g , P ) is non-null for v in (g, P ).
For all v ∈ V and (g, P ) ∈ G × P efficient relative to v, the allocation rule The uniqueness part mimics the one for theorem 1 with a constant proportional rescaling at the end. We now check that the allocation rule satisfies all properties.
Let (g, P ) ∈ G × P and v ∈ V and (g , P ) ∈ G × P efficient relative to v such that v(g , P ) = 0. The allocation rule satisfies all the properties stated in the theorem. First, it is a flexible rule as it depends on the monotonic cover and on the complete structure to be calculated.
Equal treatment of vital atoms is satisfied as the only difference between formula (4) and (6) is the multiplicative constant v(g,P )
v(g N ,{N }) , hence equal atoms are treated equally. The multiplicative constant shows that proportionality is also satisfied.
Last, consider any monotonic coalitional network games v and v in V, and scalars a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0. Then av + bv is monotonic and coincides with its monotonic cover.
Hence, (av+bv )(g N , {N }) = (av + bv )(g N , {N }) so that the multiplicative constant in formula (6) and weak linearity is proved using precisely the same steps as in the proof of theorem 1.
Proof of Proposition 4.
We first show the following lemma that applies to general semimodular lattices. 
Hence v(t) is constant on the interval [a, c]
Since the lattice of coalitional networks is semimodular, any additive function defined on it has to be constant by the previous lemma.
